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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
longer lawfully do, or else lose the property. As mentioned above,
such a result would be illogical. But by taking the doctrine of the
Shelley and Barrows cases one step further, it might be said that
the determination by a state court that such a reverter is valid, is
state action which denied equal protection of the laws to persons
within its jurisdiction. Such reasoning is not illogical when compared with the progress toward equalization of all persons, within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. If the above arguments
are valid, the holding of the principal case would not be sustained,
on appeal, or in a subsequent action.
C. M. C.

COURTS-CONSTRUCTION OF LOCAL STATUTE BY FOREIGN COURT-

SURVIVAL OF CRIMINAL ACTION AFTER CoRoRATE DISSOLUTION.-The

United States was prosecuting D corporation and three of its subsidiaries X, Y, and Z, for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
§§ 1, 2, 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, (1946), in conspiring
to fix prices, and to monopolize sales. After the filing of the information X dissolved pursuant to the laws of West Virginia, its incorporating state, and Y and Z merged with D corporation, pursuant
to the laws of their incorporating states, Delaware and New York.
D moved to dismiss the information as to such subsidiaries on the
ground that they were no longer in existence. Held, motion granted,
the law of the incorporating state governs the effect to be given to
the merger or dissolution of a corporation, and none of the states
of incorporation has statutes abrogating the common law principle
that criminal actions against corporations abate upon dissolution
or merger. United States v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 132
F. Supp. 388 (D. Col. 1955).
Is the federal court's construction binding on our own state
courts? Prior decisions leave no room for doubt that our local
courts can place their own constructions on the statute without
considering the interpretation placed on it by the federal courts.
Union Pacific R.R. v. Weld County, 247 U.S. 282, 287 (1917). In
Johnson v. Jordan, 22 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Okla. 1938), where a
federal court had construed a state statute, and the state court later
had placed a different construction on it, the federal court was now
confronted with the question of which construction is was bound
to follow. The court ruled that "[aJfter a contrary construction
by the state court of last resort, it being a matter peculiarly within
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the province of the state court, the federal courts should no longer
adhere to its [sic] former holding, but, on the contrary, should
accept the construction of the state court." Id. at 290.
The significant part of the West Virginia statute construed in
the principal case reads: "When a corporation shall ... be dissolved
... the board of directors and the executive officers ... may cause
suits to be brought, conducted, prosecuted, or defended." W. VA.
CODE C. 31, art. 1, § 83 (Michie 1949). The instant decision is of
particular interest to the West Virginia bar for the reason that
our own highest court heretofore had no occasion to pass on the
applicability of the above section to criminal prosecutions. The
court in the principal case expressed that if there were any West
Virginia cases in point it would follow the construction given by
the local court; United States v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
supra at 390. In the absence of a local construction it is well
settled that federal courts are "at liberty . . . to exercise . . .
independent judgment." Oklahoma-Arkansas Telephone Co. v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 45 F.2d 995, 998 (8th Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 822 (1930).
On the merits the court felt itself "bound by the decision of
the Court of Appeals [for the Tenth Circuit] in United States v.
Safeway Stores, [140 F.2d 834 (1944), which citation the court
failed to incorporate in its opinion] that 'suits, actions and proceedings' under the Delaware code do not embrace criminal prosecutions." United States v. Union Carbide &cCarbon Corp., supra at
390. Since the court found the pertinent 'West Virginia statute
"enough alike," though not "literally parallel," id. at 389, it found
itself to be "consistent in adhering to that decision that 'suits'
under West Virginia Law do not include criminal actions." Id. at
390.
Although the interpretation' placed upon the statute in the
principal case is correct in principle, nevertheless, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals is at liberty to allow the survival of criminal actions. Thus, it may rule that the term "suits" in this statute
is not qualified by the adjective "civil," and that there is no reason
for reading such a qualification into the statute. Marcus, Suability
of Dissolved Corporations-A Study in Interstate and Federal-State
Relationships,58 HAuv. L. REv. 675, 687 (1945). Such interpretation however, would not be in keeping with the ordinary meaning of
the term "suit." In addition, such construction would be opposed
to the common law rule that only exisiting persons can be found
guilty of crimes. United States v. Daniel, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 11
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(1848). But these arguments might be outweighed by a public
policy consideration, for does it not follow from the decision in the
instant case that "corporations could commit serious public offenses
until caught and then escape punishment simply by dissolving and
either transferring their assets to a related corporation or creating
a new one"? Marcus, supra at 703.
In a recent decision a federal district court, realizing the obligation of the court to the public, enjoined a proposed corporate
dissolution in view of an impending prosecution. United States v.
Western Pa. Sand and Gravel Ass'n, 114 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa.
1953). Although theoretically ideal, such a solution is not ordinarily
available since courts usually have no notice of an impending dissolution. Therefore it might be suggested that as soon as an information against a corporation is filed with a court, a restraining
order enjoining dissolution during pendency of the criminal prosecution should be issued as a matter of routine, at least in cases
where dissolution is not unlikely.
There is little doubt that a major public policy question is
involved. Since a corporation increases its profits at the expense of
the public it should not be permitted to escape criminal liability
by dissolution. With the rise of the corporation's dominance in
the economic life of the nation the problem is an increasing one.
Thus, financially the wrongs of corporations tend to outweigh
those of individual wrongdoers.
To prevent the frustration of policy on which the criminal
liability of corporations is based, two courses are open to the West
Virginia court when the question arises here: (1) to follow the
instant decision, in which case an implementation as that suggested
by United States v. Western Pa. Sand and Gravel Ass'n, supra, is
almost mandatory. But this solution could not insure more than
limited success because of the practical problems involved. It might
therefore be suggested that (2) the West Virginia court disregard
the present decision, which it is at liberty to do, and to interpret
"suit" as including criminal prosecutions. However, such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the maxim of construing
words according to their ordinary meaning. Moreover, since upon
dissolution the corporate assets may pass into the hands of the
stockholders within as short a period as two weeks after expiration
of ample time for the payment of exisiting debts, see W. VA. CODE
c. 31, art. 1, § 80 (Michie 1955), better means might have to be
found to hold the property subject to the imposition of a fine
until the end of the criminal proceedings.
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Since neither solution is wholly satisfactory the legislature
may have to be charged with the task of providing a remedy by
statute, (A) to extend criminal liability of corporations beyond
corporate dissolution and (B) to allow the assets to be followed into
the hands of stockholders, the real parties in interest, and require
them to respond to the extent of their distributive shares. See
State v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 184 Wis. 301, 199 N.W.
213 (1924).
M. J. P.

DEEDS-VALIDITY OF A DEED NOT SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES DESIG-

GRANToRs.-In a proceeding brought to partition real
estate, reversed on other grounds, D entered, as evidence that she
was not a proper party to the suit, a deed designating eight grantors
but signed by only D and four others. Dictum, that such deeds
are governed by the rule laid down in Ely v. Phillips; that those
parties signing a contract prepared for signatures of other persons,
to be affixed along with theirs, and intended to be signed by all the
parties named in it, are not bound until all have signed it, and
incur no obligation, if any of those who were to have signed refuse
to do so. Stalnaker v. Stalnaker, 80 S.E.2d 878, 883 (W. Va. 1954).
In Ely v. Phillips,89 W. Va. 580, 109 S.E. 808 (1921), the court
was not applying real property law to a deed but was considering an
undelivered deed as memorandum of an oral contract in a suit for
specific performance. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
and other courts have held than an undelivered deed that has been
signed is sufficient memorandum of an oral contract to sell real
property to remove the contract from the Statute of Frauds. Moore,
Keppel & Co. v. Ward, 71 W. Va. 393, 76 S.E. 807 (1912); Parrill
v. McKinley, 9 Gratt. 1 (Va. 1852). The court in the Ely case,
applying the contract rule that the parties are not bound pointed
out that such is the general rule but that there is an exception, that
in the absence of evidence showing an intent not to be bound, the
parties are bound by their signing the contract. That case turned
on the point that the contract was for the sale and removal of timber,
the court refusing specific performance on the ground that all
cotenants would have to agree to removal before the timber could
be removed, holding that this was sufficient to show that those
signing did not intend to be bound until all the cotenants signed.
Obviously, the Ely case is distinguishable as the court there was
applying contract law. The authorities are uniform in holding
NATED As
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